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Abstract. In the last decade, thousands of new grassroots groups have formed to oppose 
environmental pollution on the basis that it endangers their health. These groups have revital- 
ized the environmental movement and enlarged its membership well beyond the middle class. 
Scientists, however, have been unable to corroborate these groups' claims that exposure to 
pollutants has caused their diseases. For policy analysts this situation appears to pose a choice 
between democracy and science. It needn't. Instead of evaluating the grassroots groups from the 
perspective of science, it is possible to evaluate science from the perspective of environmental- 
ism. This paper argues that environmental epidemiology reflects 'pre-environmentalist' assump- 
tions about nature and that new ideas about nature advanced by the environmental movement 
could change the way scientists collect and interpret data. 
Since the late 1970s hundreds of thousands of people around the world have 
joined grassroots groups to protest their exposure to environmental pollution 
mad to demand some sort of action from government or industry to protect 
their health. The existence of these groups presents a dilemma for many 
policy analysts. However sympathetic the analysts may be to citizen participa- 
tion or to the environmental movement, they must confront the fact that in 
virtually none of these communities have epidemiological studies been able to 
demonstrate a clear link between the pollution and the people's diseases. 
Policy analysts have responded to this situation in two ways. Some have 
listened mainly to the scientists and treated the communities' demands as 
events to be 'managed' (Covello, et al., 1986). Others have concentrated on 
the aroused citizenry and ignored (or, in some cases, denigrated) the con- 
founding scientific studies (Levine, 1982; Edelstein, 1988; Goldsteen and 
Schorr, 1991). 
Both kinds of analysis, however, have taken the rules and methodologies of 
science as fixed. Each has assumed that the conflict between the grassroots 
groups' claims and the scientific studies will be settled when grassroots groups 
change their demands or when scientists learn more about the effects of toxic 
substances on human health. Indeed one or both of these suppositions may 
turn out to be correct. But I raise in this paper another possibility and pro- 
pose another way to analyze environmental policy conflicts. 
I focus on the radically new ideas about people's relation to nature that the 
environmental movement has developed and advanced. I argue that these 
ideas not only inspire the grassroots groups to organize, but also demand 
changes in the ways scientists gather and interpret evidence. Were there 
different kinds of scientific studies about the relation between synthetic 
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chemicals and human health, there would also be different kinds of policies to 
protect the public's health. 
The argument draws on the contention that science inevitably reflects 
scientists' 'common sense' knowledge about society. 11 am taking that idea one 
step further, however, suggesting not only that common sense continually 
changes, but also that the changes often result from the deliberate actions of 
members of social movements. 2 It was once commonly 'known' that the 
natural environment is tough and resilient, and that nature should serve the 
needs of human beings. But for the past 25 years or so environmentalism has 
fostered a different idea, and now large numbers of people assume that the 
environment is fragile, that human interference in its delicate balance is likely 
to be harmful, and that human beings are part of nature, not superior to it. 
These ideas affect science. 
The proposition that social ideas influence science is not new. A generation 
has passed since Thomas Kuhn published The Structure of Scientific Revolu- 
tions, arguing that scientists view the world through the lenses of 'paradigms' 
which order and explain the phenomena they see (Kuhn, 1962). His work 
gave rise to a resurgence of interest in the philosophy and sociology of 
science, laying a new foundation for the twin claims that theories precede 
facts, and that scientific investigations cannot be separated from the social 
contexts in which they occur (Lakatos and Musgrave, eds., 1970; Mulkay, 
1979; Wright and Treacher, 1982; Harding, 1986). If, indeed, assumptions 
about the social world do inevitably shape the questions scientists ask and do 
limit the answers they discover, then we should be able to show not just that 
society pervades science, but that major changes in society prompt changes in 
science. 
I will begin with a cold-hearted look at the scientific contentions of a 
sample of grassroots toxics groups, risking my left-of-center credentials and 
the goodwill of other progressives who hope, ironically enough, that all the 
charges of environmental pollution's damage to public health are true. 
Grassroots groups protest exposure to toxics 
Over the last decade, the shape and direction of the American environmental 
movement have changed considerably because the realization that pollution 
could cause cancer, reproductive disorders and other health problems has 
attracted large numbers of new activists. The health issue, initially assigned to 
the periphery of environmentalism and promoted mainly by local, ad hoc 
toxics groups, has now become a major program for most of the mainstream 
environmental organizations. And because environmental health activists 
have noted that racial minorities living in poor communities are more likely to 
be exposed to environmental pollution than are affluent white populations 
(Commission for Racial Justice, 1987; General Accounting Office, 1983; 
Bryant and Mohai, 1992), the health issue has also endowed environmental- 
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ism with a means to address racial equality, democracy, power, and justice. As 
a result, environmentalism is a stronger and more deeply rooted social move- 
ment than it was when it concentrated on the protection of nature. 3 
But adding health to environmentalism also makes it vulnerable to a new, 
sharply pointed attack. The classic environmental issues, like biodiversity, 
deforestation, and air pollution, are usually debated in terms of land use, 
aesthetics, and economics: topics clearly based on values and wide open to 
differing opinions. Environmental health debates, on the other hand, center 
on one narrow scientific question: does the toxin cause disease in low concen- 
trations? So far, in every actual instance of environmental pollution it has 
studied, the scientific community has been unable to answer the question with 
an unequivocal 'yes' (Upton, et al., 1989; National Research Council, 1991: 
pp. 48-54;  Caldwell, 1990). 
Consider Ponca City, a company town of 25,000 in north central Okla- 
homa. In April 1990 a lawsuit by residents against the Conoco Oil Company 
was finally settled when Conoco agreed to buy 400 homes near the refinery 
so the people could afford to move away. The citizens, the majority of whom 
had previously been apolitical supporters of the status quo, charged that 
Conoco, by allowing toxic chemicals to leak from storage tanks, had con- 
taminated the ground water around their homes. Under the terms of the 
agreement, Conoco will pay the full market value of the houses adjacent to 
the plant - an estimated total of $18 million. In addition, the company will set 
up a $5 million fund for distribution to families in surrounding neighbor- 
hoods (Anon., 1990; Suro, 1990). 
No one claims, at least not any more, that the ground water is free from 
chemicals. Conoco's own test shows benzene. The test commissioned by the 
citizens group shows benzene and also toluene and xylene. What is at issue is 
the effect of exposure to these chemicals on the residents of Ponca city. Both 
the Oklahoma State Health Department and the federal Environmental 
Protection Agency say that exposure poses no health hazard. The citizens 
group says that people living around the plant have unusual rates of cancer 
(especially leukemia), birth defects, skin rashes, breathing problems, and 
other illnesses (Anon., 1990; McNutt, 1988; Anderson, 1988). At the time of 
the court settlement, no epidemiological studies had been done to investigate 
this fear. However, the chances are very good that were such studies carried 
out, they would not identify any excess health problems attributable to 
chemical exposure. This supposition is based on the case of Love Canal. 
Everyone remembers Love Canal. In the mid 1970s, following several 
years of increased rainfall, people living in the Niagara Falls suburb began to 
notice chemical smells around the neighborhood, and, in some basements, a 
black oily substance on the walls and floors. The odors and ooze were even- 
tually traced to the Hooker Chemical company, which between 1947 and 
1952 had dumped 21,000 tons of chemical wastes in the abandoned canal. 
Hooker had then covered the dump and sold the site to the city of Niagara 
Falls. An elementary school was built near the center of the old canal and a 
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community of houses soon surrounded it. The situation hit the national press 
in 1979 after neighbors formed the Love Canal Homeowners Association 
and began to publicize reports of large numbers of cancers, birth defects and 
miscarriages. Eventually, just as in Ponca City, the homes of the residents 
closest to the contamination were purchased (in this case, by the federal 
government) so the people could leave (Levine, 1982). At this juncture, press 
coverage dropped off, so very few Americans know that no epidemiological 
study has ever shown any excess cancers among the people who lived there 
(Janerich, 1981), nor are there data supporting the claim that exposure to the 
chemicals caused miscarriages. 4 As for other health conditions, scientists 
have investigated only low-birth-weight babies and childhood illness. The 
birth weight evidence is contradictory. One investigation found an increase in 
low-birth-weight babies between 1940 and 1953 when the dump site was in 
active use, but no such increase in the years since (Vianna and Polan, 1984). 
Another study, using slightly different methods, found an increase in low- 
birth-weight babies between 1965 and 1978 (Goldman and Paigan, 1985). In 
the case of childhood illnesses, one study has shown a correlation between 
living at Love Canal and health. Compared to controls, Love Canal children 
had an elevated prevalence of seven health problems: hyperactivity, skin 
rashes, abdominal pain, incontinence, learning problems, eye irritation, and 
seizures (Paigan and Goldman, 1985). The research, however, is problemati- 
cal because the information comes not from medical records, but from inter- 
views with parents, and since the interviewing was done during the height of 
the crisis, the parents knew whether or not their children had been exposed to 
the chemicals. In addition, the first five of the seven health conditions could 
have resulted from the stress of living at Love Canal, not from exposure itself. 
(In the worthy tradition of science, the authors admit and discuss these and 
other potential problems with their findings.) The only other study on Love 
Canal residents tested their chromosomes for abnormalities (Picciano, 1980). 
The work was contradicted by later research (Heath, 1984), but the signifi- 
cance of both investigations is unclear because while chromosome damage 
does indicate that people have been exposed to toxic chemicals, it does not 
necessarily mean they will suffer any effects (Mangh, 1982). 
Another case comes to mind, one where a town undeniably experienced an 
excess of disease. Just before Love Canal became national news, residents in 
Woburn, Massachusetts began to realize that an unusually large number of 
people in town had leukemia. Between 1968 and 1979 12 children were diag- 
nosed. By 1985, there were 26 cases, both adults and children. This repre- 
sents about three times the expected number. Initially the families of the 
victims assumed the diseases were private events, but in 1979 they began to 
reconsider. In May of that year the Massachusetts environmental protection 
agency discovered that two of the city's wells were contaminated with the 
solvent tfichloroethylene (TCE) and shut them down. Worried that the well 
water had caused the leukemia cases, Woburn residents pressed the city 
government to investigate. When city officials proved recalcitrant, a group 
organized to demand action. Finally, in 1982, eight families sued the com- 
parties they held responsible for contaminating the wells. Two companies 
were eventually dropped from the suit, but the third, W. R. Grace, admitted it 
had dumped TCE on the ground and burried it in drums half a mile from the 
wells. In 1986 the eight families settled the lawsuit out of court for a reported 
eight million dollars (DiPerna, 1985; Brown and Mikkelsen, 1990; Acker- 
man, 1986; Marshall, 1986). 
Unfortunately for the residents, however, scientists have been unable to 
link exposure to TCE unequivocally with the cases of leukemia. Even though 
Woburn had a statistically significant increase in childhood leukemia rates, 
and even though children living in homes served by the contaminated water 
were more likely to develop leukemia than were children in other homes, it is 
not clear that the association between the water and the leukemia is causal. 
The one study suggesting such a relationship has been criticized for methodo- 
logical weaknesses, for not explaining the unusual number of children with 
leukemia who did not drh~k the water, for failing to account for the many 
workers who are exposed to far higher levels of TCE yet have no excess 
diseases, and for the lack of biological plausibility (Lakagos, et al., 1984). (No 
research has shown that TCE can cause leukemia. Benzene can cause 
leukemia, but TCE is associated only with cancers of the liver, kidney, and 
other internal organs.) 
These stories can be multiplied. People in untold thousands of communi- 
ties have organized to protest the disposal, emission, or discharge of chemical 
wastes, pointing to disease, reproductive disorders, and death as the conse- 
quences, s But while the presence of toxic substances in these neighborhoods 
is seldom in doubt, and the dangers to industrial workers of exposure to high 
levels is not in question, scientific evidence demonstrating a causal link 
between pollution and disease among the general population in their neigh- 
borhood is nonexistent or extremely weak. 6 
Toxicology and epidemiology 
Some scientists have tried to defend environmentalism by explaining why so 
little hard data exists to back up what the communities claim. Almost all of 
what scientists know about toxic substances, they point out, comes from 
toxicology, that is from studying animals. Unable, for all the obvious ethical 
reasons, to use human bodies to test suspected carcinogens and other 
hazards, toxicologists employ laboratory rats, mice, and other mammals 
(Epstein, 1987: ch. 3). Since 1979 it has been the official policy of the U.S. 
government as well as the International Agency for Research on Cancer to 
assume that if the animals develop cancer in controlled experiments, the 
substance is also carcinogenic to humans (Office of Technology Assessment, 
1987; International Agency for Research on Cancer, 1987). From a strictly 
scientific viewpoint however, such experiments only show whether a 
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substance is carcinogenic to the animals it was tested on. To know whether it 
actually can cause cancer in humans requires data from studies on human 
populations. But these data - the goal of another specialty, environmental 
epidemiology - are extremely hard to come by (Rothman, 1986; Rothman, 
1990). 
Environmental epidemiologists have to struggle with the fact that the 
methodology available to them is poorly suited to the kinds of situations they 
study. 7 A main problem is that the populations are usually too small. Imagine 
that people are exposed to a substance that could cause cancer in one in 
10,000 people. (This would pose a very serious public health hazard. The 
EPA's express aim in regulation is to allow no more than one extra case of 
cancer in every million people.) But Ponca City and Woburn each have a 
population of only about 30,000. (Love Canal, a suburb of Niagara Falls, was 
even smaller.) Taking these two towns as an example, if the chemicals in the 
groundwater caused one cancer in every 10,000 people, you would expect to 
see somewhere around three excess cancers yearly in each population. How- 
ever cancer is a prevalent disease. In the U.S. it accounts for about twenty 
percent of all deaths annually - or an average of around sixty in a population 
of 30,000. 8 Three extra deaths would not be a statistically significant increase. 
Any cancer mortality caused by exposure to the substance in question would 
be masked, in such a small population, by the high background level. 9 
A second problem is that the time of exposure is usually too short. 
Carcinogens are slow-acting. It can take 20 to 30 years, and for some sub- 
stances even longer, between the time of exposure and the development of a 
malignant tumor. When a population has been breathing air or drinking 
polluted water for fewer years than that, as is typically the case when environ- 
mental contamination is discovered, they have not had time to develop the 
excess cancers it might cause, so none are found. 1° 
Environmental epidemiologists encounter other problems. Exposure data 
are frequently weak; medical records are often incomplete or misleading; the 
few tumor registries and birth defect registries that exist do not compile data 
in uniform ways; and recall by people of their illnesses and miscarriages 1I is 
notoriously inaccurate (Harlow and Linet, 1989). But these are secondary 
difficulties. The limitation posed by small populations and short time periods 
could be enough to make a cautious person committed to protecting public 
health conclude from the available studies that exposure to environmental 
chemicals is hazardous. This reasoning, however, rests on the assumption that 
if you looked at the U.S. population as a whole using data collected over a 
long period of time, you would find an increase in cancer and birth defects 
over all. The premise turns out to be shaky. 
Consider birth defects. No one kept systematic records until the thali- 
domide disaster, but data for the past 25 years show unchanging figures. The 
fact is that a steady three percent or so of American babies have been born 
with birth defects each year since the mid 1960s (Oakley, 1986; Centers for 
Disease Control, 1988). The cancer mortality data are even more revealing. 
Except for lung cancer, which is almost entirely due to cigarette smoking, 
overall cancer mortality in the United States has decreased by 13 percent 
since 1950 (Bailar and Smith, 1986). Even including lung cancer, the overall 
mortality rate has been going down, and for people between the ages of five 
and 55, it has declined faster since 1975 than during the previous 25 years 
(Ries et al., 1990). The most prestigious and exhaustive study of mortality 
data to date, Doll and Peto's (1981) monograph, estimates that ambient 
environmental pollution causes only two percent of all cancer deaths (and 
occupational exposure causes another four percent). Similar estimates have 
been published more recently by the National Cancer Institute (1985) and by 
independent researchers (Gough, 1989). 
To find a basis for alarm about cancer, one could look at new cases of 
cancer, or incidence rates. It is true that while certain kinds of cancers have 
decreased, overall cancer incidence rates have gone up in the last 40 years. 
But these are hard to interpret, la In some instances the rate of cancer has 
risen dramatically but the absolute number of cases is low. (Melanoma, the 
fastest growing cancer, increased by 83.3 percent between 1973 and 1987, 
but the number of people per 100,000 with melanoma grew only from 5.7 to 
10.5.) For other kinds of cancer, the rate of new cases differs markedly 
between the sexes. (Cancers of the thyroid gland have gone up 18.1 percent in 
women but only 8.2 percent in men. On the other hand, the rate of colon 
cancer increase is about six times greater in men than in women.) For many 
cancers there are significant differences depending on race. (Rectal cancer 
rates, for example, have gone up 22.6 percent in black men, but gone down 
2.6 percent in white men. Hodgkins disease has gone down 4.2 percent in 
white women but gone down 10.8 percent in black women.) And for some 
kinds of cancer, the increased incidence rate may be an artifact of better 
detection methods, as some data suggest for breast cancer in women (Ries, 
1990; Bailar and Smith, 1986). Because of these variations across gender and 
race, as well as the issue of improved detection, it is not at all obvious that 
increases in the incidence of cancers result from exposure to environmental 
toxins. 
These data look like good news for public health, but bad news for the 
environmental movement. 13 At a time when the movement is drawing new 
strength from the participation of grassroots activists, the scientific data seem 
to say that the claims of these groups need not be taken seriously. Looking at 
the environmental groups through the lens of science, it might be reasonable 
to conclude that their members should be, if not exactly controlled, at least 
better educated. But we could switch glasses. Instead of examining the grass- 
roots groups through the lens of science, we could examine science through 
the lens of environmentalism. 
Environmentalism and pre-environmentalism 
Like other social movements, environmentalism has no constitution, no 
creed, and its self-description fluctuates with time and geography. But the 
central environmentalist concepts are the sanctity of nature and the inherent 
connectedness between nature and human beings. These ideas are new in 
modern culture. In other times and places men and women hz/ve applied 
moral reasoning to nature, have assumed that all things are interrelated and 
that humans are mere parts of a larger system of living beings. But modern 
peoples have not. Steeped in Cartesian dualism, they unconsciously presume 
distinctions between objective and subjective reality, and thus between nature 
and culture, and between scientific reasoning and moral reasoning (Harding, 
1986; Toulmin, 1990). They consider reductionist thinking superior to 
holistic thinking; they treasure the environment not for itself but for the ways 
it can serve their interests. 
Environmentalism challenges all this. Early environmentalists, epitomized 
by Aldo Leopold (1949) and Rachel Carson (1962), proposed a new ethical 
relationship to the land, advocated replacing reductionism and dualism with 
ecological and holistic thinking, and extolled living in harmony with nature 
instead of trying to control it. More recently environmentalism has grown to 
include a rich variety of ideas about nature (Nash, 1989) and has gone on to 
develop right and left wings. 14 But its fundamental ideas remain unchanged. 
They were best articulated by Barry Commoner some twenty years ago in The 
Closing Circle (1971). In that book he set down what he called four laws of 
ecology. Subsequent treatises on environmental ethics, as well as the news- 
letters and magazines published by environmental organizations, all echo 
these postulates, however much they may disagree on particulars and ramifi- 
cations (Bramwell, 1989; Devall and Sessions, 1985; Nash, 1989; Sale, 1985; 
Taylor, 1986). 15 
First, said Commoner, everything is connected to everything else; the earth 
is an elaborate ecosystem whose interconnecting parts form a network of 
multiple causes and effects. Complex feedback loops, food chains, and 
periodic fluctuations within the system and its subsystems are so delicately 
balanced that 'a small perturbation in one place may have large, distant, long- 
delayed effects' in another (Commoner, 1971: p. 35). Second, everything must 
go somewhere; there is no 'away.' We may think we have thrown something 
'out' but in reality 'it is simply transferred from place to place, converted from 
one molecular form to another, acting on the life processes of any organism in 
which it becomes, for a time, lodged' (p. 37). Third, nature knows best; over 
the eons of evolution, dysfunctional organisms and ecosystems have been 
weeded out, so to speak, and only those with compatible parts have survived. 
In this sense, nature is not perfectible. Because the best already exists (p. 39), 
any 'major man-made change in a natural system is likely to be detrimental to 
that system' (p. 37). Fourth, there is no free lunch. 'Because the ecosystem is a 
connected whole, in which nothing can be gained or lost and which is not 
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subject to over-all improvement, anything extracted from it by human effort 
must be replaced' (p. 42). 
While these principles are all interrelated, (appropriately enough for 
ecology) it is law number three - meddling with nature is detrimental - that 
underlies environmental health claims. Since people have been interfering 
with ecosystems by introducing new, human-made components, nature has 
probably been harmed. 
To assert human health has ipsofacto also probably been harmed is a con- 
ceptual leap, but most environmentalists make it. They do so on the assump- 
tion that nature and human beings cannot be separated. 16 Newsletters 
published by grassroots toxics groups usually simply point to the presence of 
synthetic compounds as proof that health is endangered. And community 
people who reject studies that fail to correlate living near a toxic waste dump 
and becoming sick often say they know intuitively that the dump causes dis- 
eases. That 'intuition' follows logically from an adoption, however uncon- 
scious, of this environmentalist principle. 17 In other words, environmentalists 
confronting a hazardous waste dump or some industrial effluent start from the 
assumption that nature has likely been harmed in a manner dangerous to 
human health. 
In stark contrast, there exists what I will call a 'pre-environmentalist' view 
of nature. This view, held until very recently by nearly all people in modem 
cultures, starts from the assumption that nature is sound, hence nature can be 
and should be used for human ends. Just as for environmentalism, there is no 
pre-environmentalist constitution, but the pre-environmentalist position is 
neatly articulated in Genesis I: 26 where God gives Adam and Eve domina- 
tion over the earth (White, 1967; Nash, 1989: ch. 4). Pre-environmentalism is 
more subtly advanced whenever people tell heroic tales of subduing nature 
for 'progress': claiming the American West, building the Panama Canal, trans- 
forming the desert into agricultural land. Pertinent to environmental toxins, 
the perspective assumes that nature can efficiently and effectively absorb the 
waste products from human activities. Pre-environmentalism was epitomized 
in the old engineering slogan, 'The solution to pollution is dilution.' It was 
reflected in almost all municipal and industrial waste disposal practices until 
very recently. And on a more mundane level, it used to show up in a sign in 
some Costa Rican buses: 'Keep this bus clean; throw your trash out the 
window.' 18 
Pre-environmentalist principles are, of course, under siege today, and the 
attacking forces are doing pretty well in the battle for hearts and minds, even 
if they frequently lose in the regulatory frays. But in science, pre-environ- 
mentalism is so deeply entrenched that its influence has hardly even been 
noticed. In standard epidemiological practice the questions one asks, the 
studies one designs, the rules of evidence one obeys, and the interpretation 
one gives to results all start from the pre-environmentalist premise that the 
ambient environment is healthful and that the scientist's task is to look for 
evidence to the contrary. Let me'give some examples. 
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To find out whether a community has been harmed by exposure to a 
hazardous waste dump, the  rules of epidemiology require investigators to 
compare the community's health status with that of a similar but unexposed 
group. In such a study the investigators look initially for an excess rate of 
morbidity or mortality. Does the community, these studies ask, have more 
disease than normal? These case-control studies use an unexposed popula- 
tion as a baseline to evaluate the effects of exposure on the test population. 
Thus it was appropriate for the New York State Health Department to give 
the citizens of Love Canal a clean bill of health, for their morbidity and 
mortality statistics were not significantly different from those of their neigh- 
bors. 
Environmentalist principles call this interpreation into question. If human 
interference in nature is likely to be harmful, then unexposed and unharmed 
populations probably do not exist. An environmentalist epidemiology would 
assume that the health of all citizens was compromised to some extent by 
exposure to toxins. Although it would acknowledge the unequal distribution 
of environmental hazards, and concentrate its efforts on identifying the worst 
cases, an environmentalist epidemiology would consider no community 
absolutely unaffected. At best an environmentalist science would deem a 
community relatively healthy. To be more positive would be seem dangerously 
like the practice among mining company doctors in the 1930s of calling coal 
miners' pulmonary ailments normal because the miners' health profiles were 
all so similar (Smith, 1987: pp. 16-17). 
Another way to put this is that from an environmentalist perspective, tradi- 
tional epidemiologic methods take the expected level of morbidity and 
mortality for the accepted level. Indeed, some environmental activists have 
recognized this bias. Furious about the implication of epidemiology that 
whatever is, is right, one man wrote, 'We must band together and fight, for if 
we don't the deaths of our children and even our own deaths are going to 
become statistics which health departments will call "normal"' (Hemstock, 
1990: p. 8). And in the same vein, Paul Brodeur, a crusader against exposure 
to electromagnetic fields and a staff writer at the New Yorker, has argued 
against employing the extant situation as the standard (Brodeur, 1989). In one 
speech he bitterly denounced the Connecticut state health department which, 
attempting to sooth a grassroots group worried about brain tumors, told them 
that cancer is a common disease. In a tone of mingled anger and sarcasm he 
asked, 'Can you imagine anything so heartless?' 19 
Instead of calling the current situation normal and merely searching for 
'excess' disease, an environmentalist epidemiology would explore ways to 
generate an absolute standard. It might be inspired by the World Health 
Organization, which uses the developed world's achievements to measure the 
health progress in developing countries, and insist that the developed world 
itself needs an ideal against which to measure its own progress. Some environ- 
mentalist scientists are, in fact, calling for standards that are independent 
of comparability. In the words of one such scientist (who was speaking of 
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resettling Love Canal): ~k standard for habitability should be based on our 
best understanding of what is healthy to live in, not based on whether [it] is 
worse or better [than something else]' (Ellen Silbergeld, quoted in Silverman, 
1989: p. 845). 
Environmentalist principles suggest that the same sort of reasoning be 
applied to the concept of a 'natural background' level of hazards. In current 
practice, when regulators try to determine how much of a suspect substance 
people can be safely exposed to, they ask how much is already in the average 
person's environment. Now, one problem with this approach is that it cannot 
distinguish between pre-existing hazards due to synthetic compounds and 
those due to naturally occurring substances. It thus allows public policy to 
treat them identically. Environmentalism, however, assigns political signifi- 
cance only to pollution resulting from human activity. So, for example, when 
the Reagan administration tried to make radon a problem similar to pesti- 
cides or acid rain, the movement paid little attention except when the radon 
could be traced to industrial dumping of radioactive waste. 
But environmentalism condemns this way of regulating chemicals on other 
grounds as well. The concept of a 'natural background' of hazards uses the 
consequences of what environmental principles identify as past mistreatment 
of the earth and its people to justify more of the same. For example, the 
former head of the Love Canal Homeowners' Association argues against the 
resettlement of Love Canal because she believes resettlement lets the govern- 
ment establish lenient residential exposure levels: 'They'll say if it is good 
enough for Love Canal, it's good enough for this place' (Lois Gibbs, quoted in 
Radelat, 1990: p. 29). Sociologist Charles Perrow makes a similar case when 
he points out that risk assessment takes the existing level of hazard as the 
standard. Regulation's only goal is not adding to it. He faults the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission for setting safety goals which permit a nuclear power 
plant to become more dangerous if other nearby industries become less so 
(Perrow, 1984: p. 310). 
There are further implications of the environmentalist principle that 
human interference probably harms nature in a manner endangering human 
health. Consider the claim I discussed earlier in this paper, that a falling 
mortality rate shows environmental pollution to be harmless to human health. 
From an environmentalist perspective the assertion is highly suspect. Envi- 
ronmentalist principles suggest that without the huge increase in chemical 
wastes deposited in the air, water, and soil since the end of World War II, the 
cancer mortality rate might have fallen even faster, the cancer incidence rates 
might be even lower, and the incidence of birth defects might have gone down 
instead of staying level. In fact, an environmentalist is no more likely to stop 
worrying about pollution when morbidity and mortality rates fall than a 
pacifist is likely to accept war when the number of casualties decreases. 
Along with rejecting the idea that the extant morbidity and mortality statis- 
tics are acceptable and only excess disease is a problem, along with criticizing 
the notion that the background 'level of pollution is natural and thus accept- 
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able, and along with challenging the logic that a falling mortality rate is some- 
thing to celebrate, environmentalist principles also question epidemiology's 
rule for determining statistical significance. 
Despite what most laypeople might imagine, environmental epidemiolo- 
gists do not directly test whether a given substance has caused disease. 
Instead, they go about it backwards, always starting with a negative hypo- 
thesis, viz: there is no correlation between exposure and disease. Every 
study's aim is to disprove the hypothesis. For this, epidemiology, like other 
sciences, demands a very high level of certainty. The general rule is that you 
must show statistically that no more than a five percent probability exists that 
your findings could be the result of chance. In other words, epidemiologists 
must be 95 percent sure of their data (it is called a 95 percent confidence 
level) before they will conclude that a correlation exists between exposure 
and disease. 
Obviously, this high standard means that epidemiology is biased toward the 
status quo. Change must be justified, and the justification, especially consider- 
ing the inherent weaknesses in environmental epidemiology, is very hard to 
make. Some critics (including me) have reproached environmental epidemiol- 
ogy for its implicit assumption that risking the physical health of those 
exposed to a substnace is preferable to risking the economic health of those 
supplying it (Tesh, 1988: p. 69-70). Other critics, however, have gone beyond 
simple rebuke. They've proposed that environmental epidemiology change its 
standard of proof. One such proposal, a fairly mild one, has already been 
generally accepted. Instead of using a single confidence level of 95 percent, 
many scientists are now relying on a somewhat more lenient standard. They 
report a range of values - a confidence interval - in which they are 95 percent 
certain their data are correct (Rothman, 1986: pp. 119-125). A second 
proposal is more radical. Commenting on the studies of Vietnam veterans' 
exposures to Agent Orange - another case where epidemiology has found no 
correlation between exposure and serious disease (Erickson et al., 1984; 
Lathrop, 1984; Tesh, 1988: ch. 6) - two scientists argue that 'the overall 
impression of the full range of studies ... should be that the health effect was 
"more likely than not" or "at least as likely as not" due to exposure' (Clapp 
and Olson, 1991: p. 32). Were this proposal adopted, and were scientists to 
implicitly lower the confidence level to 50 or 51 percent while considering all 
the available studies, the likelihood that epidemiology could corroborate the 
claims of grassroots environmental groups would probably increase. Of 
course, with the general statistical strength weakened, scientists would be less 
sure their conclusions were accurate. But if they 'knew' already that, as 
environmental principles imply, the air and water and soil were dangerously 
polluted, then they would deem necessary such a modification in epidemiol- 
ogy. Indeed, the scientific supporters of the change, cited above, explicitly 
offer it as a means to justify more rigorous environmental protection. 
A new, environmentalist epidemiology might, however, choose another 
tack entirely. Instead of presuming that nature is clean and looking for 
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evidence to the contrary, as the null hypothesis requires, investigators might 
start from the assumption that nature is polluted and look for evidence to the 
contrary. Such a tack would shift the burden of proof from those who would 
clean up the environment to those who would endanger it. 
In fact, there is a move afoot by regulators to make just such a transforma- 
tion. Federal laws in the United States used to treat synthetic chemicals as 
though they had the fights of citizens: innocent until proven guilty. But the 
Toxic Substances Control Act, for all its weaknesses, does require manu- 
facturers to submit data to the EPA showing that new chemical compounds 
are not harmful, and the makers of genetically engineered organisms must 
prove they are safe before they can be released into the environment. Other 
institutions are using similar reasoning. The  International Council for Bird 
Preservation used to publish lists of extinct bird species based on the concept 
that unless proven extinct a species still existed. But scientists who hope to 
raise alarm about the rapid destruction of bird habitats from environmental 
degradation have urged the organization to reverse its hypothesis. The ICBP 
is beginning to assume that a species is extinct unless proven extant. By 
shifting the burden of proof like this, some scientists argue, ornithologists will 
be able to document more effectively the greatly reduced number of bird 
species in the tropics (Diamond, 1987; Diamond, 1989). 
Conclusion 
I have been arguing that the lack of scientific data to support environmental- 
ists' claims is an artifact of the pre-environmentalist assumptions underlying 
epidemiology. Were epidemiologists to accept the principles of environ- 
mentalism, they would start their analysis of environmental disease with the 
assumption that disposing of industrial waste in the air, water, and soil is 
probably harmful. What happens instead is that epidemiology, in the (false) 
guise of neutrality, starts from the premise that disposing of waste is probably 
safe. This departure prejudices the scientific endeavor against community 
groups' claims before investigations even begin. 
It is important to note that most environmentalists, including the scientists 
among them, use nothing like the analysis of scientific bias I've sketched out 
here to justify their support for grassroots toxics groups. The common view 
among environmentalists is that when science is uncertain, pubfic policy 
should not risk people's health. One such scientist asks rhetorically, 'If there is 
room for scientists to debate, why are [people] exposed in the interim?' (Coye, 
1979: p. 173). But the principle, standing alone, is empty. A generation ago 
when scientists debated the safety of fluoride, politically progressive scientists 
supported the addition of this chemical to drhfldng water. The major differ- 
ence between that debate and current debates about chemicals is that the 
fluoride issue was not attached to a social movement. It was part of preventive 
medicine, linked to practices like immunization. Today, however, fluoride is 
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sliding out of its medical category into an environmental one (Marshall, 
1990). It's beginning to look like an instance of water contamination. Now its 
safety is debated in a new context. The fluoride issue is becoming part of 
environmentalism, where the addition of chemicals to the air, water, and soil 
has moral and ethical connotations. It is connected to the idea that the 
environment is fragile, that human interference in its delicate balance is likely 
to be harmful, and that human beings are part of nature, not superior to it. 
Thomas Kuhn called ideas like these paradigms, and maintained that para- 
digms organize and give meaning to facts, but are themselves never tested, 
only articulated. 2° And indeed, we cannot know whether the environment is 
resilient or fragile, whether humans can or cannot safely 'intervene" or 
whether people are part of or separate from nature. Such ideas are starting 
places for scientific studies, not themselves useful objects of study. Most 
people, scientists and non-scientists alike, tend to adopt one view or another, 
but we do not do so because empirical research has proven our view 'true.' 
Michael Mulkay also makes this point when he says that scientists commit 
themselves to notions of 'atomistic discreetness or continuity, to harmony or 
conflict, to development or equilibrium, and so on.' Quoting Holton he points 
out that such commitments are 'neither directly evolved from, nor resolvable 
into, objective observation on the one hand, or logical, mathematical, and 
other formal analytical ratiocination on the other' (Muikay, 1979: p. 99). But 
commitments of this sort are necessary. Paradigms (or theories, or ideologies, 
or world views) tell scientists what questions are appropriate and what 
answers make sense. They lie behind scientific understandings about the 
proper design of studies. They give rise to the rules for establishing causality. 
What we are witnessing at the end of the 20th century is a full-scale attack 
by the environmental movement on the old paradigm about nature. If it is 
impossible for science to be value-free, if scientists must draw on concepts 
outside of science to give their work focus and establish its rules, and if 
science is already based on some (human-made) ideas about nature and 
peoples' relation to it, then it is legitimate for members of the movement to 
press for new ways of construing nature and thus new ways of doing epide- 
miology. Indeed, it will be difficult for environmentalists to prevail against 
pollution unless they can successfully transform the dominant beliefs about 
nature, as well as the accepted scientific procedures for investigating the 
effects of the pollutants on human health. 
Does this mean that anything goes? That one paradigm is as good as any 
other and that epidemiologists can choose whatever ideas and values appeal 
to them? No, for just as facts are rooted in values, so are values rooted in 
facts. They are not free-floating. Values have actual consequences. If the old 
ideas about nature justify risking human health, they are poor guides for a 
science whose goal it is to prevent disease. Knowing what empirical events are 
likely to follow from embracing pre-environmentalist ideas makes 
environmentalist ideas more seemly. Perhaps it is for this reason that environ- 
mentalism has made deep inroads in modern thinking. 
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Large numbers of people have come to believe that protection of the envi- 
ronment is as important a social goal as peace or justice. Many of these 
people are scientists. They are actively promoting new rules for determining 
causality, consistent with the environmentalist paradigm. For example, they 
are pressing for reconsideration of the 95 percent confidence level (Clapp 
and Olson, 1991; Weinberg, 1985; Hoffman, 1984) and proposing new 
epidemiologic rules for inferring that hazardous waste exposures affect health 
(National Research Council, 1991: pp. 30-31). During the Carter administra- 
tion they got regulatory agencies to adopt a policy about the identification of 
carcinogens consistent with environmental principles. 21 And they successfully 
pressed the Reagan administration to add a pollution prevention office to the 
EPA. At the same time, of course, other environmentalists both inside and 
outside the government have worked hard - and continue to work hard - to 
pass environmental laws, to promulgate and enforce environmental regula- 
tions, and to establish new policy (Paehlke and Torgerson, eds., 1990; Vig 
and Kraft, 1990; Rosenbaum, 1991). This work is crucial for social change, 
and I do not mean to minimize its importance. But proponents of environ- 
mentalism also exercise a more subtle power. They promote new ways of 
thinking about the environment, new social goals, and new ethical principles. 
Because ideas - unlike laws, regulations, and policies - tend to be insinuated, 
not proposed outright, their impact can be more profound. 
Were environmentalism to be completely successful, were everyone to 
incorporate environmentalist ideals in their moral reckoning, the practice of 
using the air, water, and soil around us as a dump for toxic substances would 
be unthinkable. Instead, industries would as a matter of course either re- 
absorb toxic wastes back into the production process or use non-toxic 
materials in the first place. But the establishment in modern culture of a new, 
ethical relationship to the environment, if it ever happens, will take many 
generations. Some proponents, undeterred, note the long struggle before 
blacks and women in the U.S. were even legally recognized as full human 
beings, let alone the time it is taking to overcome prejudice (Nash, 1989). In 
the meantime, grassroots environmental groups, by attributing their diseases 
to pollution regardless of the scientific evidence, will continue to reflect and 
promote environmental principles, edging the movement along. 
Notes 
1. For elaboration on this point about 'common sense' see Mulkay (1979: p. 98). 
2. New Social Movement scholars are right to fault previous analysts for neglecting the 
importance of ideology to social movements. But by and large these scholars think move- 
ments simply provide a meeting ground for people who already share certain befiefs and 
values. In contrast, I am arguing that movements develop the beliefs and values in the first 
place. For a collection of relevant essays see Dalton and Kuechler, eds. (1990). 
3. I am dating the environmental movement from about 1970, with Earth Day the point of 
departure. Prior to that time, the existing environmental protection organizations had not 
16 
produced a real social movement. That is, they did not advocate social change, nor were 
there significant numbers of 'members' unaffiliated with an organized group. On social 
movements, see Boggs (1986), Dalton and Kuechler, eds. (1990). 
4. The idea that living at Love Canal caused miscarriages was widely publicized by the New 
York State Department of Health in a brochure produced the first summer of the crisis. 
(See New York State Department of Health, 'Love Canal: Public Health Time Bomb' 
(September 1978.) But the data were preliminary, the study from which they came was 
never published in a peer-reviewed journal, and even the most sympathetic scientists today 
do not include miscarriages in their reports on Love Canal (National Research Council, 
1991: pp. 48-54). 
5. No one knows exactly how many such communities exist. Lois Gibbs, the director of the 
Citizens Clearinghouse for Hazardous Waste (CCHW), a support organization for grass- 
roots toxics groups, says that her organization now works with well over 7,000 groups in 
this country (Personal communication). There has been a steady increase; in 1987 CCHW 
identified 2500 groups (Gibbs and Stultz, 1988: p. 245). Even assuming that some of these 
current groups are defunct or exist in name only, the total number undoubtedly exceeds 
7,000 since many groups do not affiliate with CCHW. 
6. The absence of data from community studies should not be taken to mean that there are no 
carcinogens or teratogens. As early as 1979 the World Health Organization's International 
Agency for Research on Cancer had identified 18 chemicals, groups of chemicals, and 
industrial processes that cause cancer in humans, and 18 chemicals and groups of chemi- 
cals that probably cause cancer in humans (International Agency for Research on Cancer, 
1979: pp. 12-13). Most of the data on human carcinogens comes from research on 
workers. As for teratogens, 30 substances are known to cause congenital anomalies in 
humans, 18 of them drugs and environmental chemicals. (The other known human terato- 
gens are radiation, infections, and maternal metabolic imbalances.) (Shepard, 1989: 
pp. xiii, xxii.) 
7. Epidemiologists who study infectious diseases have an easier time. Bacteria and viruses 
can be extracted from the body and deemed causative according to the Koch-Henle 
postulates. In contrast, most environmental pollutants leave no biological markers. The 
exceptions are heavy metals like lead and arsenic. Currently, technologies are being 
developed to identify pesticides which accumulate in body fat. 
8. The annual overall death rate is 872.4 per 100,000 population. Of that number 195.9 die 
of malignant neoplasms (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1990: p. 10). 
9. Actually, the situation is even more difficult for environmental epidemiologists because 
only a subset of the populations of these towns was exposed to the chemicals in question. 
10. Leukemogens and radiation are exceptions. For these substances, the time between 
exposure and disease is much briefer. 
11. For miscarriages the problems of recall and assessment are compounded by the fact that 
about one-third of all pregnancies fail to survive long enough to be clincally recognized 
(Wilcox et al., 1988). 
12. Cases of a disease are harder to tabulate than death rates because while everyone gets a 
death certificate, only some people's diseases are reported. For a discussion of problems 
with data collection see the introduction in Zeiger and Weisburger, eds. (1981). 
13. At least they seem like bad news for the part of the environmental movement concen- 
trating on health. Scientists are in greater agreement about the effects on the ecosystem of 
deforestation, global warming, and destruction of the stratospheric ozone layer, than about 
the health effects of exposure to synthetic compounds. Of course, damage to the ecosys- 
tem itself has health consequences - some direct (e.g., increased incidence of melanoma 
from destruction of the ozone layer), some indirect (e.g., global warming causing crop fail- 
ures and, consequently, malnutrition or famine). 
14. On the branches of radical environmentalism, see Bookchin and Foreman (1991). On the 
branches of mainstream environmentalism, see Hays (1987). For a typology of environ- 
mentalism, see Dryzek and Lester ('1989). 
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15. In addition to the academic literature, see The Amicus Journal, published by the Natural 
Resources Defense Council; Greenpeace Magazine; and Everybody's Backyard, published 
by the Citizen's Clearinghous for Hazardous Waste. 
16. The assumption underlies the field of environmental ethics. One writer says that 'avoiding 
anthropocentrism may well be the sine qua non of environmental ethics' (Harlow, 1992: 
p. 28). Nearly every issue of Environmental Ethics carries an article about the relation 
between humans and nature. For examples, see Colwell (1987), Taylor (1984). 
17. Environmentalist scientists often reject such studies also, but their 'intuition' is undoubted- 
ly reinforced by their knowledge of the effect of the substance(s) at higher doses on 
workers and (at higher doses yet) on laboratory animals. 
18. Personal communication from travelers Diana Tesh and Mark Vlahakis. 
19. Keynote address to ConnectiCOSH Convention, April 26, 1991, Hartford, Connecticut. 
20. 'No part of the aim of normal science is to call forth new sorts of phenomena; indeed those 
that will not fit the box are often not seen at all . . . .  Instead, normal-scientific research is 
directed to the articulation of those phenomena and theories that the paradigm already 
supplies' (Kuhn, 1986: p. 24). 
21. The principle assumes that certain synthetic chemicals are carcinogenic to humans even in 
the absence of epidemiological data (Office of Technology Assessment, 1987: pp. 23-74). 
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